There is no single answer to the question 'how far back?' and the legal community needs to identify the appropriate cases and provide the compelling arguments that will lead to the just result.
N early every person probably has heard the adage 'where there is a right, there is a remedy' (ubi jus ibi remedium), a phrase which suggests that the very notion of a right is inextricable from having an enforceable claim. (See in general, Dinah Shelton's, Reparations in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 1999) ). The international law of human rights certainly lists the right to a remedy as one of the rights to be guaranteed in national law. If no domestic remedy is afforded because of lack of access to a competent forum or lack of a basis for reparations in substantive law, a growing number of international procedures allow claims to be brought against the state that committed the wrong.
The issue of reparations for human rights violations has drawn increasing interest in recent years. The UN has studied the problem, appointing a series of special rapporteurs to study aspects of the issue. The Durban World Conference on Racism organised by the United unresolved with the hope that they will be forgotten. There are many ways to categorise reparations claims. I suggest three main divisions:
1. Individual claims. One person is wrongfully arrested and detained; a single factory is illegally confiscated; an individual is prosecuted under a law that conflicts with the state's human rights obligations. These are the cases taken to Strasbourg, or to the Inter-American Commission and Court, or to one of several UN bodies.
Gross and systematic violations.
The language is that of the UN, designating a level of violations that can be deemed a breach of the United Nations Charter. These are serious and widespread occurrences in a state: racial segregation in the US or apartheid in South Africa; forced disappearances in Honduras and Argentina; systematic torture in Chile; arbitrary executions in the Philippines; all of the above in some States.
3. Historic injustices. These are claims that pre-date the international law of human rights, in some cases stemming from acts that took place centuries ago.
Genocide of indigenous groups in many parts of the Western Hemisphere; brutality during wartime; slavery; religious persecution; the sacking of Constantinople by the crusaders or the burning of the library of Alexandria by the Romans.
All three categories have some elements in common: a perceived wrong or injustice for which the victims, survivors or descendants seek redress. But the reality is very different when examined more closely.
In international law, reparation for human rights violations is a sub-category of the law of state responsibility. According to this body of law, every breach of an international obligation automatically gives rise to a duty to make full reparation, by restitution if possible and by compensation and/or satisfaction if restitution is not possible. The recently completed articles on the law of state responsibility make clear this objective. The goals are to bring the offending state into compliance with the law and to provide compensatory justice to the injured party. Although the rules were drafted for the inter-State context, there is language in them stating that they are 'without prejudice' to the obligations that may be owed to non-State actors.
What are the problems? 
THE PROBLEM OF HISTORIC INJUSTICES
The Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the United Nations has recently commented at the Durban Conference on the link between the past and the present: 'Sometimes (today's) rights organization, a defense fund and a university. An African-American Representative in Congress sponsored a bill in Congress in 1989 to study reparations for African Americans and has repeated the proposal in every Congressional session since that time. The proposal has never made it out of committee.
The above claims have been dealt with largely in the political arena. In contrast, lawsuits for reparations for historic injustices have not been successful. In Cato v United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.1995 for example, the court rejected slave reparations. It found the existence of treaties between Native Americans and the United States to be an important factor in their reparations, because the treaties created relationship between nations and thus made the situation unique. The court also noted the statute of limitations and sovereign immunity as a O J basis for denying relief, indicating that the legislature is the appropriate forum to press the claim of slave reparations.
CRITIQUES OF REPARATIONS FOR HISTORIC INJUSTICES
The debate over reparations for historic injustices has been loud and contentious. Opponents cite to the cost, both in money and social upheaval. It is estimated that if the current 22 million African Americans took up the promised value of 40 acres and a mule the resulting compensation would probably amount to several trillion dollars. These arguments are similar to those that calling for respecting domestic amnesties for violations of human rights in the name of societal reconciliation. Opponents also claim that reparation has occurred, because modern civil rights laws are reparative, especially when they include affirmative action measures.
On a practical level, the identification of specific perpetrators and victims becomes much harder as time and distance increases. With slave reparations, for example, how should the classes of victim and perpetrator be identified most persons are diverse in their ancestry and may have both slaves and slaveholders among their forbearers. Race is not a scientific concept and identifying those entitled to claim reparations on that basis could be particularly problematic. Some object on principle. Henry Hyde, a Republican Member of Congress, has stated: Historical claims thus cannot rationally be based upon the paradigm of individual perpetrator, individual victim, and quantifiable losses; causation of present harm is especially difficult to show. Finally, the calculation of the quantum of damages is almost impossible. All these factors pose formidable obstacles to obtaining reparations through judicial action or even legislation.
Author Eric Yamamoto further argues that it is a mistake to think that reparations will lead to broader societal changes. In his view Japanese redress in US does not appear to have moved society more broadly towards racial justice or against stereotypes, and has not prevented other groups from being targeted as the Japanese were. However, it may be part of a discourse that can move the state to take further actions in its power in favor of new social arrangements that can restructure. The problem is to ascertain whether reparation for historic injustice will heal or create a sense of new injustice and a backlash by those who must pay, reawakening old stereotypes, old injuries and further inflaming mistrust and anger. ( 
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REPARATIONS
Proponents of reparations point to the symbolic importance of apology and redress. Japanese Americans who were interned suffered lingering harm and bestowal of symbolic reparations fostered long overdue healing for many ' . . . a measure of dignity was restored'. (See Eric Yamamoto, ''Symposium: Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Claims', 40 Boston College L. Rev. 477, 478 (1998) ). Another internee said 'reparations have allowed many of us to put aside our bitterness and constructively reflect upon our responses to the internment. ' (Quoted in Michael Honda, 'Japan's War Crimes: Has Justice Been Served?' 21 Whittier L. Rev. 621, 622 (2000) ). According to him, it succeeded in bringing closure in two infinitely critical ways. First, it stipulated to the truth that the community was innocent and the internment was not justified.
Second, it recognised that the community suffered immeasurably and that by paying reparations the United States symbolically accepts the detriment the community suffered (ibid, at 623).
In rebutting the critique about the inability to identify individual victims of distant injustices, proponents argue that reparations are about groups, not individuals. Many base their claims on theories of unjust enrichment, contending that much of today's wealthy individuals and institutions obtained their riches through privilege and suppression, exclusion and discrimination of others.
On the positive side, proponents posit that reparations for historic injustices have a broader purpose and benefit: restructuring the institutions and relationships that underlie the grievance. They seek to address root causes not simply obtain monetary compensation. In international terms, they are seeking reconciliation and looking at social transformation. They argue that post-civil war reconstruction in the US failed precisely because no reparations were implemented. Without land redistribution and economic benefits, freedom for slaves left them without possibility of upward movement. In sum, the question of 'how far back' has no single answer. The circumstances of each historic injustice must be looked at to determine whether reparations are warranted and possible. In some instances neither the victims nor the perpetrators can be identified with any degree of certainty, nor can causality between the historic injustice and present circumstances be established. Yet, there are other cases where unjust enrichment is clear, where the immorality and even illegality of the acts at the time they were committed can be proven, and where reparation is necessary to redress the moral imbalance and restore the dignity and humanity of the victims. The task for the legal community is to identify the appropriate cases and provide the compelling arguments that will lead to the just result. @
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